The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. Anti-federalists insisted that a Bill of Rights must be included in the Constitution to protect individual's rights against a powerful central government. It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. Theme: Presidential Power Focus: the issue of energy and how these ingredients can be combined with others that are safe in the republican sense? These causes have produced interferences of foreign powers in the election of the king of Poland.
There was here no danger of presidential power-grabbing. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. One has a like concurrent authority in making appointments to offices while the other is the sole author of appointments. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition — vigor and expedition, and this without anycounterbalancing good. It will be more expensive to staff the separate governments, especially because each would have to worry about inter-state threats to their own security and defense. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description. Alexander Hamilton The Federalist Papers Summary No 69: Hamilton March 14, 1788 This rather lengthy paper down plays the power of the President of the United States by comparing his powers to that of the King of Great Britain and in some instances to the governors of various States. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention.
Supposedly then the Governor could be involved in a conspiracy and if exposed prior to actual activities pardon all accomplices. Further having electors chosen for this single purpose would eliminate the possibility of corruption from internal or external sources. The choice of several, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Such men of distinction would be the most capable of deciding which presidential candidate had the best qualifications for office. The union serves as a better means to promote commerce, especially in competition with Europe. It may be said that this is an extravagant case, and will never happen.
The republican form of government works to prevent factions because a higher number of representatives guard against the attempts of the few, and because the extended sphere of the republic makes it less probably that a faction will become a majority of the whole. This was often the downfall of direct democracies, where all the people decided on public matters directly rather than through representatives. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place. As he is vested with the power of making treaties, and as there is a material distinction between the carrying and productive states, the former will be disposed to have him to themselves. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior.
Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. We know how much the powers of Europe have interfered with Sweden. In writing this essay, the author sought to convince the people of New York of the merits of the proposed Constitution. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. Summary The way of electing a president, Hamilton noted with relief, was almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure.
Therefore the people choose electors in each State for this special purpose in a manner directed by the State Legislature. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. Works referenced in Federalist No. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group. Responsibility is of two kinds — to censure and to punishment. The answer depends on how we define republicanism and federalism. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue.
The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. Because of his central role in creating the U. The power of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State.
Hamilton also answers criticism that the Senate should have been given the power to select the vice president instead of the Electoral College. One of the inherent weaknesses in a government based on the will of the people is the potential for mob rule. The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. He is one of the five highest, if he have but two votes, which he may easily purchase. I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment.